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Abstract: 
This paper presents findings from a study testing the alternative of 
an  institutional  approach  to  model  intrahousehold  allocative  behavior.  It 
argues that the income-pooling test and the conventional neoclassical house-
hold models only capture part of allocative behavior as they start from the 
premise that human behavior is built upon free human agency only.  The 
paper proposes an alternative economic institutional approach and sets out 
an expanded test framework. Research findings from my own south Indian 
household survey show that conventional and expanded test results may differ 
and that unveiling decision-making processes may indicate why individuals 
act as if they hold common preferences. The article demonstrates that changes 
in selected allocative outcomes only occur as a result of changes in underlying 
allocative processes. It further suggests that membership of women’s groups 
is one effective way of changing intrahousehold decision-making processes 
and outcomes.4 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 5
Résumé
Cet article présente les résultats d’une étude qui teste la valeur ajoutée 
d’une approche institutionnelle pour modeler l’allocation et l’interaction au 
sein du ménage. Les modèles néoclassiques et le test conventionnel sont cri-
tiqués pour leur incapacité de visualiser l’entièreté de l’interaction familiale. 
Une approche économique institutionnelle et un test alternatif sont présentés. 
Les constatations de l’étude de cas en Inde du Sud montrent que les résultats 
du test conventionnel et alternatif peuvent différer. En plus, les données in-
diquent que des changements dans l’allocation peuvent seulement être réal-
isés suite aux modifications dans les processus de décision. Etre membre de 
groupements de femmes est une manière efficace de changer les règles de 
décision.  This paper presents findings from a study testing the alternative 
of an institutional approach to model intrahousehold allocative behavior. It 
argues that the income-pooling test and the conventional neoclassical house-
hold models only capture part of allocative behavior as they start from the 
premise that human behavior is built upon free human agency only.  The 
paper proposes an alternative economic institutional approach and sets out 
an expanded test framework. Research findings from my own south Indian 
household survey show that conventional and expanded test results may differ 
and that unveiling decision-making processes may indicate why individuals 
act as if they hold common preferences. The article demonstrates that changes 
in selected allocative outcomes only occur as a result of changes in underlying 
allocative processes. It further suggests that membership of women’s groups 
is one effective way of changing intrahousehold decision-making processes 
and outcomes.  1.  Introduction
    International development organizations such as the United Na-
tions Development Programme and the World Bank increasingly acknowl-
edge that systematic discrimination of half of the world’s population is one of 
the most important obstacles impeding economic growth and economic and 
human development (UNDP, 1995; World Bank, 2001). One of the crucial 
ingredients towards the achievement of these goals is the investment made 
in the next generation’s human capital. While a nation’s human capital ef-
ficiency influences the level and quality of investments, it is mainly within 
the household that the latter is decided upon. Furthermore, there is mounting 
evidence that investments made within the household may not be harmonious 
with government investments. In their 1992 Filipino research, Marito Garcia 
and Ben Senauer found for instance that supplementary feeding programs 
which target vulnerable individuals within the households, mostly girls of a 
higher birth order, resulted in failure because households were reallocating 
nutritional inputs which had been given earlier to the targeted individuals 
in order to compensate for the additional food these household members re-
ceived through the feeding program.
Policy makers clearly need insights into what happens within the black 
box of the household in order to design thoughtful policy measures. If it is for 
instance the aim to increase investments in children’s human capital and to at-
tenuate male bias in allocation, they need to know which factors to influence 
in order to make policy interventions effective and efficient.
Exploring questions regarding household allocative behavior brings us 
within the realm of household economic models. The silence of neoclassical 
economics on matters related to intrahousehold allocation has lately been 
compensated by a rapidly expanding literature1. Despite the fact that neither 
approach may be considered a homogeneous block, most authors distinguish 
between unitary and collective preference models. In a first section of the pa-
per I summarize the main characteristics of both groups of models and their 
policy implications.
The starting point of the present article is the income-pooling test, 
which is one of the tests used to distinguish empirically between both groups 
of models. I argue that the latter test leads to erroneous conclusions when al-
locative behavior is strongly influenced by norms. The criticism does not only 
affect the conventional test but also points to the limitations of both groups of 
conventional neoclassical approaches. The article proposes an economic insti-
tutional framework based on earlier contributions from feminist economists 
and critical institutional economists.
Testing the value added of the alternative institutional approach is done 
through the broadening of the conventional test. Firstly, rather than focusing 
exclusively on allocative outcomes, the expanded test also highlights under-
1 Articles and books, which give 
a global or partial review of exist-
ing theories, include among oth-
ers Beatrice L. Rogers and Nina 
P. Schlossman (1990); Lundberg 
and Pollak (1994); Folbre (1996); 
Alderman, Haddad and Hoddinott 
(1997); Cheryl R. Doss (1997).8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 9
lying decision-making processes. Secondly, the assessment of the impact of 
non-wage-income, which is at the core of the conventional test, is expanded 
towards the study of the impact of collective action, which is one of the instru-
ments of institutional change.
Empirical testing was done on the basis of my own survey of 300 house-
holds in Tamil Nadu. In these households, living in the same area and belong-
ing to the same socio-economic strata, credit entered in different ways, which 
allowed constructing a quasi-experimental research setting. More specifi-
cally, I compared the impact of direct credit to men and women (conventional 
test) with the impact of credit to men and credit to women who received credit 
through the financial and social intermediary of women’s groups (expanded 
test). The research findings demonstrate that different tests lead to different 
conclusions regarding the appropriate model and the policy measures to be 
adopted. Unveiling allocative processes further reveals that the impact of 
women’s group membership on allocative outcomes only occurred as a re-
sult of changes produced at the level of underlying allocative rules. Research 
findings indicate that women’s groups, as actors of institutional change, were 
able to broaden the bargaining area within household decision-making which 
subsequently led to changes in children’s and in particular girls’ health care 
investments. 
2.  Conventional Neoclassical Economic Household Models  
    and an Alternative Economic Institutional Approach
2.1.  Conventional neoclassical economic household models and  
    testing between them.
   
    Unitary approaches consider the household as a socio-economic 
unit where different members pool their resources and redistribute them op-
timally following incentives from the outside world. The household utility 
function is considered to be equal to a one-person utility function2. Intra-
household allocative outcomes are arrived at through the maximization of the 
one-person utility function subject to a general budget and time constraint. 
Factors which influence the allocation of resources, are total income, prices 
of different goods and personal endowments, the latter being exogenously 
given. 
The unitary approach is appealing because of its relative simplicity and 
the multiplicity of issues it can address. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with 
differences in individual welfare within the household, even when these dif-
ferences are systematic along lines of sex and age. What may not be explained 
by a unitary approach, however, is the substantial evidence that has been gath-
ered from diverse cultural settings on the existence of diverging preferences 
exhibited by mothers and fathers. Different studies lend support to the idea 
that mothers, as compared to fathers, prefer to allocate a higher percentage 
2 Approaches within this strand, 
e.g. the consensus model of Paul 
Samuelson (1956) and the house-
hold  model  of  Gary  S.  Becker 
(1981),  differ  in  the  way  they 
equalize  the  household  utility 
function with a one-person utility 
function.8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 9
of the household budget towards human capital goods, especially those of 
children (Joan P. Mencher, 1988; Eileen Kennedy and Pauline Peeters, 1992; 
Duncan Thomas, 1997 ; Shelly A. Phipps and Peter S. Burton, 1998). Based 
on survey data from Brazil, Duncan Thomas (1994) further found evidence of 
the phenomenon of ëgendered preferences’, with mothers preferring to devote 
more resources to improve their daughters’ nutritional status and schooling, 
while fathers preferred to invest in sons’ health and education.
Efforts to explain this inconsistency bring the collective preference 
models into the picture.  They consider the household as a locus of both con-
flict and cooperation. Partners are conscious of the fact that through coopera-
tion their overall well-being might increase, but they do not necessarily agree 
on the division of the gains. The possibility of diverging preferences is ex-
plicitly pictured through the inclusion of different individual utility functions 
within the household utility function.  How resources are finally allocated 
and which influencing factors are important, is dependent on the particular 
collective preference model adopted. The best-known collective preference 
models are the bargaining models3. In the latter, “threat points”, i.e. the utility 
a person may arrive at in case of non-cooperation, play a crucial role in the 
determination of the final outcome4.
The  debate  among  adherents  of  unitary  and  collective  preference 
models is not merely of academic importance. Sharply different policy im-
plications derive from both groups of models. The discussion about the ef-
fectiveness and efficiency of targeting interventions to individual household 
members is strongly influenced by the insights from intrahousehold interac-
tion modeling. Proponents of a unitary approach consider targeting a useless 
and probably costly operation. For them the only way in which allocation 
outcomes may be changed, certainly in the short run, is through conventional 
price and income policy.  Conversely, advocates of collective preference mod-
els conclude that targeting individual members in the household is necessary 
if particular allocative outcomes are to be obtained.
In order to distinguish empirically between the different models, sev-
eral tests have been elaborated. Differentiating between the collective and 
unitary models has mostly been done by comparing the marginal impact of 
additional resources alternately controlled by men and women on specific 
intrahousehold resource allocation outcomes. While most authors did use a 
form of non-wage income for testing (see e.g. Thomas, 1990, 1994, 1997; 
Paul T. Schultz, 1990), others have focused on the impact of labor income 
(see e.g. François Bourguignon, Martin Browning, Pierre-André Chiappori 
and Valerie Lechene, 1994), assets brought to marriage (see e.g. Agnes Quis-
umbing and John Maluccio, 1999) or microcredit (see e.g. Mark M. Pitt and 
Shahidur R. Khandker, 1998).
3 Bargaining models may be fur-
ther classified into ëcooperative’ 
and  ënon-cooperative’  on  the 
basis  of  the  acceptance  of  the 
assumption  of  binding  and  en-
forceable agreements and Pareto-
efficient outcomes.
4  Whether  threat  points  are 
thought of as the utility function 
in case of divorce (outside threat 
point)  or  rather  as  a  non-coop-
erative  equilibrium  within  the 
household  (inside  threat  point) 
further  differentiates  bargaining 
models  from  each  other.  While 
earlier  versions  of  bargaining 
models  (see  a.o.  Marily  Manser 
and  Murray  Brown,  1980;  Mar-
jorie  B.  Mc  Elroy  and  Mary 
Jean  Horney,  1981)  have  mostly 
assumed an outside threat point, 
more recent contributions as the 
“Separate  Spheres  Bargaining 
Model” of Lundberg and Pollak 
(1992)  and  the  “Conjugal  Con-
tract Model” of Michael R. Carter 
and Elizabeth G. Katz (1997) opt 
for a more realistic inside threat 
point.10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 11
2.2.  Criticism on the income-pooling test and both groups of
  conventional neoclassical economic approaches
    The most frequently cited problems with the income-pooling 
test relate to the degree of exogeneity of the measure of income used and the 
degree of control that each partner has over this income5. As Harold Alder-
man, Lawrence Haddad and John Hoddinott (1997) point out, most of these 
problems may be countered through the particular form of income chosen, or 
through specific research design and statistical controls at the moment of data 
analysis. However, I believe that a more crucial drawback flaws the income-
pooling test.
The test relies on observed allocative outcomes to make inferences 
about the household members’ preferences and decision-making processes. 
Limiting information to observed allocative outcomes might be an efficient 
strategy in a lot of cases. However it may lead to erroneous conclusions about 
allocative behavior if decisions are the outcome of norm following. It is highly 
unlikely that influencing the bargaining power of one of the partners will lead 
to changes in outcomes in cases where bargaining is not perceived by them to 
be a legitimate undertaking. In such cases the conventional test suggests that 
a unitary approach is valid and policy makers will rely on the corresponding 
basket of policy levers to influence the household’s behavior. However, it is 
as unlikely that decisions based on norms will be influenced by price incen-
tives, which also puts the unitary approach into perspective. Focusing merely 
on intrahousehold allocative outcomes while leaving the processes unveiled 
may thus lead to erroneous conclusions and potentially powerful policy levers 
may be disregarded. Insight into processes might enable us to understand why 
and for which particular items individuals act as if they hold common pref-
erences and it might help us to formulate policy interventions which do not 
only change outcomes but also the allocative rules on which the outcomes are 
based.
On the basis of the foregoing analysis I question the ability of conven-
tional approaches to grasp that part of household allocative behavior where 
individual agency is absent. For they all focus on that part of household reality 
where the legitimacy to bargain is already established, leaving other parts, not 
necessarily the least important ones, unveiled. As against this, I consider hu-
man behavior the result of individual agency, norm adoption and the interac-
tion among them. I do not deny the importance of bargaining. I rather support 
Shelly Lundberg and Robert A. Pollak (1996) in their idea that an important 
part of bargaining takes place at a higher level where it is decided on which 
issues bargaining is legitimate and on which issues norms should be followed. 
To substantiate this, I turn to an economic institutional approach.
5  Sen  (1983)  puts  this  element 
of criticism into perspective. He 
points at the fact that even in case 
a  person  does  not  fully  control 
her/his  income  it  may  still  pro-
duce a rise in her/his threat point 
due  to  the  fact  that  it  increases 
her/his “perceived” contribution, 
one of the elements of the “break-
down points” as defined by Sen.10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 11
2.3.  The alternative of an economic institutional approach
    Putting the household within the context of an institutional anal-
ysis enables us to understand its origin and the causes of variation through-
out time and space. Building on insights from the transaction cost literature 
(Oliver E. Williamson, 1985), the household may be conceptualized as an in-
stitutional arrangement, which has a comparative advantage in governing ef-
ficiently relational contracts among individuals6 (see e.g. Yoram Ben-Porath, 
1980).
Typical of relational contracts is their highly transaction-specific char-
acter and the lesser degree of standardization which leaves considerable room 
for influence from the state, the religion, culture (Robert A. Pollak, 1985). 
Inducing cooperation and regulating conflicts among different members is es-
sentially done on the basis of two mechanisms, i.e., “shared norms and ideolo-
gies” and “hierarchy”. Some of the most entrenched norms and ideologies de-
fining the realm of choice and regulating intrahousehold behavior are related 
to gender. Division of labor based on gender whereby each partner specializes 
in a number of particular tasks, is a powerful mechanism through which costs 
of coordination are diminished and through which gains of the household as 
a governance structure may be realized. The particular nature of social con-
structs such as gender also facilitates their enforcement. As the community 
wherein one resides shares them, disobedience leads to disapproval and in a 
number of cases even to expulsion from the community. As argued by Jon El-
ster (1989), where norms are strongly internalized, external sanctions are less 
needed as deviation triggers the powerful internal cost of shame.
Once gains from cooperation within a particular institution have been 
realized, they should also be redistributed. While the economizing function 
of institutions has been emphasized most in the explanation of the origin of 
institutions, history has proved that it is not always the primary motive for the 
establishment or the survival of a particular institutional arrangement (Mar-
garet Levi, 1990; Justin Yifu Lin and Jeffrey Nugent, 1995). As Nancy Folbre 
(1994) argues, institutions and norms, such as gender, which regulate conflict 
between social groups, offer opportunities for “collective rent-seeking”. By 
constraining behavior and making it highly predictable, gender is clearly 
functional in facilitating human interaction. If however some groups are more 
constrained in their behavior than others and if the latter are able to impose 
their choices on the former, “the structures of constraint” become exploitive 
and even inefficient as they systematically hamper competition. 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) would not worry so much 
about such inequitable and inefficient situations as they are fairly optimistic 
about the possibility of institutional change. If individuals believe that alter-
native institutional arrangements are more efficient and if net benefits of the 
alternative governance structure outweigh the costs of institutional change, 
NIE is confident that a new institutional form will evolve. More critical insti-
6    In  rural  communities,  which 
are often characterized by highly 
imperfect or even absent markets 
and  high  transaction  costs  in 
exchange,  also  more  non-trans-
action-specific contracts such as 
production,  consumption,  insur-
ance  are  governed  within  the 
household or within families.12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 13
tutional economics and feminist economists7 are clearly more skeptical about 
the possibility of institutional change.
Yet, notwithstanding all possible constraints on institutional change, 
historical evidence suggests that individuals are able to modify and defy 
norms and rules, especially when acting as a group. In the realm of gender, 
men and especially women were able to question, over the last century, the 
traditional gender roles that constrained their behavior and even to adopt, 
within limits, what society considered to be deviant behavior.
One powerful way in which relevant norms and the institutions that 
rely on them may be changed is through collective action. Based on research 
findings from among others Bina Agarwal (1994) and Naila Kabeer (1995), 
I consider women’s groups as a powerful instrument to weaken the applica-
tion of traditional gender norms and to enlarge the domain of free individual 
choice in household interactions. Often originally organized around the ful-
fillment of practical gender needs, women’s groups may start engaging in 
extrahousehold bargaining with the community in order to make it legitimate 
to bargain within the household on issues which were before residing in the 
“non-choice” domain (Agarwal, 1997). Shifting issues into “the choice” area, 
broadening in this way the scope of household decisions open to individual 
agency, may, in many cases, be considered a necessary precondition for the 
effectiveness of more conventional policy incentives which are adopted to 
influence allocative behavior within the household. Starting from literature 
on collective action and building further on research findings from Agarwal 
(1994, 1997) and Kabeer (1995) I have tested the impact of collective action 
through women’s groups on intrahousehold allocative behavior within a south 
Indian context.
2.4.  An expanded test framework
    Interestingly women’s groups included in the field study were 
originally organized around credit and the local variety in credit models ena-
bled to draw a linkage to the conventional income-pooling test.  More specifi-
cally, households below the poverty line living in the area mainly received 
credit in three different ways: direct credit to men, direct credit to women and 
credit to women through the financial and social intermediary of women’s 
groups.
Comparing the impact of credit targeted directly to men and women on 
selected intrahousehold allocative outcomes exemplifies conventional testing. 
Putting the results of the latter test against those which arise from a com-
parison of the effects of credit to men and credit to women through women’s 
groups sheds light on the shortcomings of the conventional test. Broadening 
the  information  base  to  underlying  decision-making  processes  highlights 
linkages among allocative outcomes and underlying rules which is useful in 
understanding why the conventional test may lead to erroneous conclusions. 
7  See among others Edna Ullman-
Margalit (1977); Elaine McCrate 
(1987);  Pranab  Bardhan  (1989); 
Levi (1990); Folbre (1994); Janet 
Seiz (1995).12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 13
3.  Empirical Testing
3.1.  Methodology, Research Setting and Data
i.  Selection of Credit Programs
    The most serious drawback of using credit as an instrument for 
testing arises from the potential selectivity bias that might occur when as-
sessing the impact of different credit schemes. The point is often made that 
different credit schemes recruit or attract different individuals. Members of 
women’s groups are for instance thought to be those women who already had 
a higher stake in household decision-making at the outset, eventually explain-
ing a women’s group observed impact on intrahousehold allocative behavior. 
As to circumvent potential threats to the validity of research results, 
I opted for a quasi-experimental cross-sectional research design that influ-
enced the selection of the different credit programs, the research setting and 
the study population.
I selected credit programs that were highly similar in outlook except for 
the borrower’s gender and the delivery model. The Integrated Rural Develop-
ment Programme (IRDP) is a poverty alleviation program launched through-
out India in 1978, which is directly targeting credit for productive use to men 
and women below the poverty line8. Although the IRDP guidelines point at 
the importance of the follow-up and training of beneficiaries, different studies 
(see a.o. World Bank, 1991; Raghav Gaiha, Katsushi Imai and P.D. Kaushik, 
2001) have highlighted the inadequate supervision, which reduces the IRDP 
to a one-time dose of credit. The IFAD-funded Tamil Nadu Women’s Devel-
opment Programme (TNWDP) has been conceptualized together with local 
non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs)  to  remedy  IRDP  deficiencies  in 
the selection, monitoring and enforcement process. It is operational in the 
southern state of Tamil Nadu since 1990, targets households with a similar 
socio-economic profile and uses similar financial conditions regarding inter-
est rates, subsidies, loan repayment period and loan use requirements. The 
main innovative element within the TNWDP is the focus on women’s groups, 
often called Self Help Groups, to channel individual IRDP loans, enterprise 
development training and social welfare services to group members. Within 
the selected research area of the Dharmapuri District, two NGOs, the Mysore 
Resettlement and Development Agency (Myrada) and the Rural Integrated 
Development Organization (Rido), have been operational in backing up wom-
en’s groups. The main difference between the two NGOs is the more devel-
oped organizational and management structure of Myrada, explaining why it 
has been able to organize more training sessions, diversify its training content 
and supervise group formation and maturing more closely.
In order to test whether longer group membership had additional ef-
fects on decision-making patterns, thereby also dealing with a possible selec-
8  In 1989, household below pov-
erty line were identified as those 
whose annual household income 
was below 6 400 Rs., from 1996 
onwards the cut-off point was set 
at 11 000 Rs.14 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 15
tion bias, I included a membership duration variable. The highest variability 
in membership duration was found in the Dharmapuri District as it was the 
region where the TNWDP was first implemented and where groups were 
formed from 1990 until 1994.
Based on all these characteristics, I identified the following five credit 
program variables: i) direct credit to men through IRDP extended in 1993-4 
(Male IRDP); ii) direct credit to women extended in 1993-4 (Female IRDP); 
iii)  credit  to  women  member  of  Myrada  groups  since  1993-4  (Myrada 
Young); iv) credit channeled in 1990-1 to women member of Myrada groups 
since 1990-1 (Myrada Old), v) credit channeled in 1990-1 to women member 
of Rido organized groups (Rido Old).  Comparing the impact of the first and 
second credit scheme exemplifies the conventional test while a comparison 
of the impact of the first and third independent variable is illustrative of the 
expanded test9.
ii.  Research Setting
    As the limitation of the sample size, imposed by time and re-
source constraints, posed a threat to statistical conclusion validity, I further 
standardized  as  much  as  possible  between  and  within  each  of  the  credit 
schemes. One particular area within the Dharmapuri District, i.e. Morappur 
Block, was selected where IRDP and TNWDP loans are extended through 
three bank branches of the Indian Bank which use the same standard regula-
tions and which are partly staffed by the same persons.
The research area is an exclusive agricultural area where about 42 per-
cent of the population was identified as below the poverty line in 1991 and 
where Tamil is the dominant language. While south India is characterized by 
the Dravidian culture, which in general poses less severe restrictions on girls’ 
and women’s behavior than the Aryan culture of northern India10, any such 
appreciation should be put against the general background of female discrim-
ination. Data from the National Information Center (NIC) of Dharmapuri 
shows that even in Tamil Nadu less human capital goods are invested in girls, 
which result in female/male sex ratios and literacy rates standing below unity. 
In Morappur Block, for instance, the female/male literacy rate stood at about 
60 percent in 1991 and 74 percent in 1996 while sex ratios even declined from 
971 per 1,000 men in 1981 to 935 in 1991 and 926 in 1996.
iii.  Study Population and Sample
    The number of IRDP beneficiaries in the research area total 600 
per year, 30 percent of which are women. For the period 1990-1, 497 women 
received a loan under the TNWDP in the Morappur Block. Of the 497 about 
397 belonged to Myrada groups and 100 to Rido groups. In the period 1993-4, 
247 women benefited from a loan, of these beneficiaries about 200 were affili-
ated with Myrada groups. From each of the five groups I randomly selected a 
9  For  an  overview  of  all  test 
results,  see  Nathalie  Holvoet 
(1999).
10 While there is no agreement on 
the definition of “the north” and 
“the east”, most researchers agree 
on the demarcation of “the south”. 
Included  are  the  states  of  Kar-
nataka, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala 
and Tamil Nadu. On difference in 
women’s status and female auton-
omy between northern and south-
ern Indian states and underlying 
economic, cultural and religious 
rationale, see e.g. Agarwal (1994) 
and Partha Dasgupta (1995).14 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 15
sample of fifty households. In order to avoid diffusion effects I have selected 
IRDP beneficiaries and control group households in villages where women’s 
groups were not operational. With a view to gauging the net impact of a par-
ticular credit scheme and to accommodate for the selection bias that might 
differentiate all credit receivers from non-credit receivers, a control group of 
fifty households was selected at random from the 7,500 households who were 
identified as below poverty line on the basis of the survey of the District Rural 
Development Agency (DRDA). Within the 300 households, 1,026 births were 
reported of which 560 boys and 466 girls.
Table 1, which gives an overview of sampling details and scores on a 
number of selected background characteristics using retrospective data, illus-
trates that at the moment of credit receipt different sub-samples did not differ 
substantially from each other. Most of the households belonged to backward-
casts, were landless or owned a small piece of land. The majority of the wom-
en and about fifty percent of their husbands could neither read nor write. 
As this article mainly focuses on comparing i) IRDP Female versus 
IRDP Male beneficiaries and ii) TNWDP Young versus IRDP Male benefici-
aries, we have tested formally for statistically significant differences between 
those groups. Results of t-tests11 show that on average IRDP Female benefici-
aries were more likely to belong to landless households while they at the same 
time had a higher chance of earning an independent income. Interviews with 
local keypersons have pointed out that the access to an independent income 
could be indicative of a lower gender norm application in general within those 
households. The same inverse relationship between socio-economic status and 
gender norm application is also visible when comparing IRDP with TNWDP 
Young beneficiaries. The latter were on average more likely to belong to 
households that owned land, which may be exemplary of their slightly higher 
socio-economic status, while at the same time they were less likely to have 
access to an independent income. Revealing an inverse relationship between 
the position of a woman within and outside the household is not new. Earlier 
studies (see e.g. Meena Acharya and Lynn Bennett, 1982; Agarwal, 1994) 
have described the same phenomenon. If anything, the data does not support 
the assertion that TNWDP Young beneficiaries tended to be the initially more 
empowered, on the contrary. It was rather the IRDP Female beneficiaries who 
belonged to households that applied gender norms less strictly. As this might 
even explain why those women (and not their husbands) did obtain the credit 
in the first place, a selection effect could be playing. As to avoid contamina-
tion in impact measurement, we will control for statistically significant differ-
ences in background characteristics in the outcome equations.
11 Table 1 includes t-values and 
significance levels for those vari-
ables  where  the  null-hypothesis 
of ëno difference’ was rejected.16 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 17
Table 1: Sampling information and scores on selected background  















Number of households 50 50 50 50 50 50

















  % most backward














  % yes













Mean quantity of land owned (in acres)  2.12 (1.6) 1.91 (2.1) 1.98 (1) 1.75 (1.2) 1.83 (1.12) 1.97 (1.5)
Mean age of female respondents (years) 33 (10.8) 36 (9.5) 36 (8.3) 38 (8.9) 37 (7.5) 33 (10.1)
Literacy status of female respondentb
  % yes













Literacy status of husband
  % yes













Independent income earned by
female respondentc
  % yes













Note:  Figures in parentheses are standard deviations 
(a)  difference between IRDP Female and IRDP Male (base category) is statistically significant at 10% level (t-value: 1.876);    
  difference between TNWDP Young and IRDP Male is statistically significant at 10% level (t-value: 1.759)
(b) difference between IRDP Female and IRDP Male is statistically significant at 1% level (t-value: 3.486); difference between    
  TNWDP Young and IRDP Male is statistically significant at 1% level (t-value: 3.492)
(c)  difference between IRDP Female and IRDP Male is statistically significant at 5% level (t-value: 2.245)
iv.  Dependent Variables
    The dependent variables are regrouped under two main headings, 
i.e. allocative processes and allocative outcomes. Most empirical research 
about decision-making processes is somehow based on the influential work of 
Robert O. Jr. Blood and Donald M. Wolfe (1960) but so far no straightforward 
measures have been developed12. As decision-making patterns tend to differ 
alongside the issues to be decided upon, I opted to study different fields of 
decision-making separately rather than adding them up into one indicator (see 
also Susan P. Douglas and Yoram Wind, 1978). I further followed the sug-
gestion of Acharya and Bennett who in their 1982 study of decision-making 
processes in Nepal, asked questions about easily defined past decisions rather 
than questioning behavior in too general terms, which helped to reduce social 
desirable  answering  and  hypothesis-guessing.  “Decision-making  mecha-
nism” was finally constructed as a categorical variable with seven answer-
ing categories, i.e. “the wife (female decision-making)”, “the husband (male 
decision-making)”, “others”, “norm following”, “jointly with equal influence”, 
“jointly with more influence for the wife”, “jointly with more influence for the 
husband”. At the moment of the analysis the last three categories were pulled 
12 A number of empirical studies 
on  “decision-making”,  “marital 
power” and “women’s status and 
empowerment”  were  reviewed. 
See  among  others  Acharya  and 
Bennett (1982); Benjamin White 
(1984); Frances Woolley and Ju-
dith Marshall (1995) on “decision-
making”;  Graig  M.  Allen  and 
Murray A. Straus (1984); George 
H.  Conklin  (1988);  Karen  D. 
Pyke  (1994);  Constantina  Safil-
ios-Rothschild (1970) on “marital 
power”  and  Syed  M.  Hashemi 
and  Sidney  R.  Schuler  (1993); 
Carol Vlassoff (1994) on “wom-
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together into one category “jointly (bargaining)” whereas the minor category 
“others” was joined with “norm following”. 
Children’s health and education were chosen as the allocative outcomes 
under study. In the present article, the analysis is limited to girls’ and boys’ 
health input indicators. The choice for particular indicators has been guided 
by secondary literature13, by the gaps in existing research and the financial 
and time constraints of my own research. The focus of existing research has 
mainly been on food and nutrient intake, whereas considerably less attention 
has been paid to non-food health inputs as health care (Lawrence Haddad, 
Christina  Pena,  Chizuru  Nishida,  Agnes  Quisumbing  and  Alison  Slack, 
1996).  I have opted to study the incidence of medical treatment in case of 
illness and the incidence of paid medical treatment by a private doctor (versus 
free medical treatment in a public health care center).  The latter was con-
sidered an indicator of the quality of medical care14 while it also indicated to 
what extent parents were willing to invest money alongside time in the health 
of their children.
v.  Data Collection and Analysis
The data was gathered late 1997 through a structured survey with fe-
male interviewees. In the 200 households where the wife was the beneficiary 
she herself was interviewed, in the fifty households with male beneficiaries 
their wives were interviewed. In control group households, the wife of the 
household head or the female household head was interviewed. Apart from 
the face-to-face interviews, which were taken from each of the women sepa-
rately, I also conducted semi-structured interviews with twenty-one women’s 
groups and informal interviews with key non-sample informants. Self-re-
ported information regarding children’s health care inputs was supplemented 
by data obtained from local public health care centers and private doctors. 
Relevant secondary literature and participant observation15 were useful in 
interpreting the survey research findings.
Assessing the impact of credit programs on children’s health care in-
puts was done through logistic regression models. I tested for the differential 
impact of credit programs through the calculation of the odds ratios that sum-
marize in a single statistic the effect of one credit program versus another. 
Wald statistics were used to indicate whether differences in impact were 
statistically significant16. Table 2 summarizes odds ratios obtained and indi-
cates significance levels for those cases where the null-hypothesis of equality 
of effects was rejected. Regression results in table 2 further give an account 
of the differential impact of credit programs on the prevalence of different 
decision-making mechanisms. Odds ratios using norm following as the base-
category were calculated on the basis of loglinear logit models and rejection 
of null-hypotheses was assessed on the basis of Wald statistics.
13  See among others Chen, Huq 
and  D’Souza  (1981);  Caldwell, 
Reddy and Caldwell (1983); Basu 
(1989);  Barbara  Harriss-White 
(1990); Dasgupta (1995).
14  On the basis of several visits to 
both primary health care centers 
and private doctors, I concluded 
that there was a considerable dif-
ference  in  the  quality  of  health 
care  offered,  which  was  partly 
due  to  different  hygienic  condi-
tions.  More  important,  however, 
was  the  attitude  of  the  doctors. 
Most of the doctors at the public 
centers had at the same time their 
own private practice in the same 
village,  which  strongly  influ-
enced  their  work  attitude.  They 
often  did  not  show  up  during 
opening hours, they did not deliv-
er a number of medical services 
and recommended people to visit 
them instead at their own practice 
where medical care needed to be 
paid for.
15    During  the  period  of  data 
collection (July 1997 till the end 
of  November  1997)  I  lived  in 
Kadattur, one of the villages of 
the  Morappur  Block.  In  order 
not to influence research results, 
none of the women living in the 
village  was  included  within  the 
sample.  Participant observation 
within  the  village  nevertheless 
helped  the  interpretation  of  the 
empirical findings.
16  As multiple comparisons were 
performed,  the  Bonferroni  tech-
nique was used to adjust for the 
inflation in the type I-error.18 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 19
Regression results summarized in Table 3 demonstrate whether and 
to what extent the impact of credit programs on health inputs was produced 
through  changes  in  underlying  allocative  processes.  Adding  the  variable 
“decision-making mechanism” to the first model specifications yielded the 
results given in the second model specifications. They illustrate the remaining 
impact of credit program variables while the Step Chi-Square tests show their 
additional explanatory power.
3.2.  Research findings and discussion
i.  Conventional test results versus expanded test results
Results of the statistical analysis summarized in Table 2 suggest that 
IRDP credit in hands of mothers and fathers does not produce any statisti-
cally significant differential effects. While boys, but especially girls seem to 
fare better when their mother receives credit (odds ratios IRDP Female/IRDP 
Male are all above unity), none of the recorded differences prove to be sub-
stantial enough to reject the unitary approach hypothesis.
Calculation of estimated probabilities indicates that in general the data 
lends support to evidence from earlier studies which have shown that when 
they are ill girls tend to receive less and worse medical treatment than their 
brothers (Alake Malwade Basu, 1989; John C. Caldwell, P.H. Reddy and Pat 
Caldwell, 1982; Lincoln Chen and Stan D’Souza, 1980; Lincoln Chen, Em-
dadul Huq and Stan D’Souza, 1981; Monica Das Gupta, 1987). The pattern 
slightly differs between IRDP Male and Female households. Extending IRDP 
loans to mothers tends to weaken the existing male bias more, but differ-
ences are too small to be significant. Illnesses of boys and girls in IRDP Male 
households have a 68 percent and 47.2 percent chance respectively of being 
treated, while in IRDP Female households probabilities stand at 69.9 percent 
and 51.8 percent. While the male bias regarding the treatment of illnesses is 
rather modest, it substantially increases when it comes to the kind of medical 
care sought. Boys in IRDP Male and IRDP Female households have respec-
tively a 73.3 percent and 67.6 percent probability of being treated by a private 
doctor, these percentages decline to 38.2 and 41.1 in case of girls.
While some minor differences in effects are recorded when comparing 
impact of IRDP credit in hands of mothers and fathers, the unitary approach 
cannot be rejected. The conventional test results suggest that targeting of 
credit to women does not really pay off.18 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 19
Table 2: Overview of results of the conventional and expanded test

Unitary Approach Restriction
Dependent Variables I. Conventional Test
(H0: IRDP Female= IRDP Male)










1. Incidence of medical treatment 
in case of illness (N=917)
Allocative Outcomes




  female decision-making/norm following
  male decision-making/norm following













2. Incidence of private medical 
treatment (N=629)
Allocative Outcomes




  female decision-making/norm following
  male decision-making/norm following













* significance at 5%   ** significance at 1%
Broadening the test to the impact of credit delivered through women’s 
groups reverses the conclusions. While it does not seem to matter much for 
sons how credit enters the household, it clearly is important for daughters. 
Test results summarized in Table 2 suggest that the unitary approach restric-
tion should be rejected for all children in case of the incidence of medical 
treatment, and for girls in case of both variables. Compared to children living 
in IRDP Male households, children whose mother received credit through 
Myrada Young women’s groups have about 2.2 times more chance of being 
treated when ill rather than being left without treatment. For girls, this ratio 
even increases to 3.9. As regards the kind of medical treatment sought dif-
ferential effects of women’s group membership are more modest: only for 
daughters can the unitary approach be rejected. Girls whose mother is a 
member of a women’s group are 3.8 times more likely to receive private medi-
cal care than their counterparts in IRDP Male households. Women’s group 
membership clearly has a more outspoken beneficial effect on daughters than 
on sons. Calculated probabilities even point at a reversal of the male bias in 
case of the incidence of medical treatment, while the existing pattern of fe-
male discrimination remains regarding the kind of medical treatment sought. 
Probabilities of being treated upon illness stand at respectively 72.9 percent 
and 77.6 percent for boys and girls, while the probabilities of being brought to 
a private doctor stand at 74.3 percent and 70.1 percent respectively for boys 
and girls.
Expanding the test has in a number of cases led to the rejection of 
the unitary approach restriction and to other policy conclusions. Where the 
conventional test would have led to the conclusion that targeting to particular 
individuals did not have any results, the expanded test shows that this con-20 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 21
clusion must be qualified. Research findings show that targeting of credit in 
combination with women’s group membership has been effective in provok-
ing changes in children’s and especially girls’ health care investments.
Broadening the analysis to decision-making processes shows that direct 
channeling of credit to mothers and fathers did not produce any substantial 
differential effects on allocative processes taking place within the household. 
This conclusion is put into perspective when expanding the test towards the 
TNWDP. Compared to spouses of IRDP male beneficiaries, it is about 5.6 
times more likely that women who received credit through Myrada Young 
Groups decide alone about the incidence of medical treatment than that they 
follow norms. The latter odds ratio even increases to 17.6 for decision-making 
regarding the kind of medical treatment sought for.
ii.  Linkages between allocative processes and outcomes
    Comparing  the  results  of  testing  for  outcomes  and  decision-
making processes reveals that in neither of the cases substantial changes were 
produced in the former without similar changes in the latter. Results of statis-
tical analysis summarized in Table 3 support this conclusion and demonstrate 
that the impact of the TNWDP on allocative outcomes may be exclusively 
attributed to shifts in the underlying allocative rules. Adding the variable “de-
cision-making mechanism” leads to a significant increase in the explanatory 
power of the models (Chi-square of the additional block is respectively 26.2, 
3 df, p<0.001 and 34.9, 3 df, p<0.001) and washes out the previously recorded 
statistically significant impact of the TNWDP. Without shifts in decision-
making patterns, which were provoked by women’s group membership, no 
significant effects on the allocative outcomes would have been recorded.
The introduction of the “decision-making mechanism” in the logistic 
regression models further allows focusing on the linkage between differ-
ent decision-making mechanisms and the allocative outcomes produced. A 
shift away from norm adoption or decision-making by other members of 
the household clearly leads to a significantly higher investment in boys’ and 
girls’ health care. Arriving at decisions through bargaining and female deci-
sion-making causes the most striking effects. Compared to their counterparts 
whose parents adopt norms or who leave decisions up to others, illnesses of 
boys and girls whose mothers take decisions alone are, for instance, about 5.4 
and 46.43 (= e(1.689+2.149)) times more likely to be treated.
The interaction effect of “decision-making mechanism” and “sex of 
the child” shows that different decision-making mechanisms affect boys and 
girls differently. While norm adoption unexceptionally leads to a serious 
male bias, research findings suggest that bargaining and in particular female 
decision-making predominantly benefit girls, even to the extent of the male 
bias being reversed into a preferential treatment of girls. Whereas adopting 
local norms makes it about 8.4 (=1/0.119) times more likely that boys rather 20 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 21
than girls will be brought to a private rather than a government doctor, using 
other decision-making mechanisms attenuates the sex-differential pattern of 
investment. Despite the closing of the gap, fathers deciding alone still exhibit 
a strong preference for spending money primarily for the treatment of their 
sons’ illnesses. Sons, as compared to daughters, are about 2.2 (1/0.453, 0.453= 
e(-2.126+1.334)) times more likely to receive higher quality treatment. When deci-
sions are arrived at together and especially when mothers decide alone, the 
effect on girls is significantly higher than the one produced on boys: it is about 
2.15 (= e(-2.126+2.891)) times and 5.24 (=e(-2.126+3.782)) times more likely that higher 
quality medical care is sought for daughters rather than for sons. The latter 
observations lend support to evidence from other studies (Thomas, 1994; 
Thomas, 1997) about the existence of “gendered preferences” with mothers 
preferring to invest more in daughters and fathers in sons.
Table  3:  Logistic  Regression  Models:  Effects  of  Different  Credit 
Programs and Different Decision-Making Mechanisms on the ëIncidence 
of Medical Treatment in Case of Illness’ and the ëKind of Medical Treat-
ment’
Dependent Variable: Incidence Of Medical Treatment
In Case Of Illness
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Number of Male Children<10
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1  reference category for credit program is “control group”
2  reference category for decision-making mechanism (DM) is “norm following and decision-making by others”
*  significance at 5%
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iii.  False consciousness
    In neither of the cases was I able to prove that the interaction ef-
fect of “credit program” and “decision-making mechanism” was statistically 
significant. This indicates that the use of a particular decision-making mecha-
nism generated about the same effect in all sub-samples. Irrespective of the 
credit program, less norm following, for instance, leads to a weakening of the 
male bias. What differs between the different sub-samples is the actual use of 
different decision-making mechanisms, a factor which it itself largely influ-
enced by exposure to different credit programs. The absence of an interaction 
effect casts some doubts on the prevalence of “false consciousness” (Amartya 
Sen, 1983) and lends support to the thesis of Agarwal (1994) that the absence 
of female claims about their own inferior treatment should not necessarily be 
considered as a proof of false consciousness. Rather, it is the absence of a le-
gitimate forum to express the claims which explains their silence. Interviews 
indeed indicated that women did have a number of preferences that differed 
from those of their husbands. However, it is only after they became a member 
from a women’s group that they were convinced about the legitimacy of these 
diverging preferences and that they were able to express their preferences 
through the increased voice in household decision-making. Extra-household 
bargaining with the community through women’s groups further reduced the 
external sanctions on non-conform behavior and made expulsion from the 
community a less viable threat, which changed the perceived costs and ben-
efits of ëdeviating’ behavior.
4.  Conclusions
    The present article argues that the income-pooling test, which is 
used to differentiate between unitary and collective preference approaches, 
may lead to erroneous conclusions. In case items are studied which do not 
reside (yet) within the bargaining area, the conventional test will unequivo-
cally point at the prevalence of a unitary household model and will advise 
policy makers to rely on the toolkit of price and income incentives. However, 
it is unlikely that the latter will lead to changes in allocative outcomes as it is 
highly hypothetical that the underlying allocative rules will thus be changed.
I put forward the argument that the income-pooling test and neoclas-
sical household models are based on the premise that behavior is the sole 
result of free human agency. Empirical evidence as well as contributions from 
feminist and critical institutional economics point at the importance of norm 
guided behavior, which is not necessarily a less important drive for human 
behavior. Starting from the idea that human behavior is the result of free hu-
man agency, norm adoption and the interaction among both, I endeavored to 
demonstrate the potential value added of an economic institutional approach.22 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 23
In order to test the value added of the institutional approach I expanded 
the conventional test in two directions. Firstly, in addition to the comparison 
of impact of credit in hands of men and women, I studied the impact of credit 
combined with collective action through women’s groups, the latter being a 
mechanism of institutional change. Secondly, I broadened the information 
basis from a mere focus on allocative outcomes to allocative processes. This 
enabled to focus on linkages between allocative outcomes and the underlying 
allocative rules.
Empirical findings from my south Indian research strongly suggest 
that in respect to girls’ health care investments, conventional and expanded 
test results differ. While the former leads to the acceptance of the unitary ap-
proach hypothesis, the latter indicates that it is important how credit enters 
the household. If policy makers opt to increase the probability that girls will 
be treated upon illness and will receive higher quality treatment, they may use 
women’s groups as an instrument to target resources to mothers.
Broadening  the  analysis  towards  decision-making  processes  has 
shown that the impact of women’s groups on allocative outcomes is largely 
due to changes that have been induced in household allocative processes. My 
research findings suggest that the use of particular decision-making mecha-
nisms lead to particular outcomes, which also differ for boys and girls.  Norm 
following, for instance, leads to female discrimination in health care invest-
ment while bargaining and especially female decision-making are associated 
with a preference to invest in daughters. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
that the impact of different decision-making mechanisms differs across dif-
ferent credit programs, which puts into perspective the idea of women’s “false 
consciousness”. What differs is the actual use of different allocative rules, the 
latter being strongly influenced by the particular credit program in which one 
participates.24 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 2524 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-03 • 25
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